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While it is increasingly becoming a platitude that exceptionalism exists in 
international law, little is being said about the nature, degrees of this exceptionalism 
and their differential consequences on the international legal system.  
In my effort to bridge what I see as an oversight, this paper will seek to 
show how contemporary exceptionalist practices are creating a fault in the 
international legal order which will in turn provide a basis for others to argue for an 
overall reformulation of rules i.e. actions in contravention of the multilateral 
international legal framework would no longer need to be justified by manipulative 
rule interpretation but by a clear challenge to the very morals and standards on 
which they are built. The friction between these unilateral ambitions and the 
widespread opposition to incidents along the lines witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq 
(which perhaps indicative of a larger disaffection with the option of being 
exceptional as a matter of right) will not only undermine the interests of the 
international community but will also prove to be against the interests of even the 
most exceptional hegemon (which will ultimately find it impossible to sustain its 
position of global influence in the face of rapidly fading trust and legitimacy).  
Thus, conforming to the Charter paradigm and keeping state 
exceptionalism tied within multilateral restrictions is not only in the larger interest of 
global peace and security but also in the specific interest of any state seeking to 
retain its position and mandate as a global peacekeeper. In the course of this paper, 
I will seek to explore the possibilities that various kinds of exceptionalism opens up 
for the future of the international order and argue that the ends will satisfy neither 
the goals of any state(/s) nor the international community as a whole.  
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(I) THE PROBLEM WITH GLORY  
Oh the history books tell it, they tell it so well 
The cavalries charged, the Indians fell 
The cavalries charged, the Indians died 
Oh the country was young, with God on its side.1
The history of the world has seen four realistic attempts when “men have sat down to 
reorder the world”; the most recent of these was after World War II in San Francisco 
(1945) leading to the formation of the United Nations.2 This was to be an organization 
aimed to further peace, whose tools would be diplomacy backed by collective security3
and whose very basis of existence would be an unfettered belief in the equality of 
nations.4
1BOB DYLAN, WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE, verse 2, © 1963 M. Witmark & Sons, renewed 1991 
Special Rider Music. 
 
2 Historian JOHN KEEGAN has cited the other 3 occasions as:  “at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
after the Thirty Years War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, in Paris 
in 1919 after World War I”, as cited in STEPHEN SCHLESINGER, More Than Ever, We Need the 
UN, Los Angeles Times (Wednesday, September 24, 2003) (available at: 
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0924-06.htm). 
 
3 U.N. Charter, Chapter V, 59 Stat. 1031 T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, amended 24 U.S.T. 2225 
T.I.A.S. 7739 [hereinafter Charter]. Much has been said lauding the collective security 
mechanism --- See DAVID D. CARON, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security 
Council, 87 AM. J. INTL. L. 552, 573-574 (1993); MICHAEL HOWARD, The Historical 
Development of the UN’s Role in International Security in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 
63, 77-78 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds. 2nd ed. 1993) (discussing the effectiveness 
of the UN Peacekeeping Forces). However, enough of the literature raises doubts on the ability of 
international law to assure global security, see John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global 
Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 205, 208-209 (2000); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-
Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (2003);  
 
4 Id. Charter, art. 2, para 1. The principle has been endorsed at a number of fora, for instance, at 
the 1945 San Francisco Conference it was pointed out that States are “juridically equal”, see 
UNCIO VI, 457, Doc. 944, 1/1/34 (1). Similarly, the 1970 Friendly Declaration spelt out that 
States “…have equal rights and duties”, see U.N.GAOR 2625 (XXV) of 24th Oct. 1970. Thus 
while undisputed and realistic equality may not ever have been a reality, the principle of 
sovereign equality is a concession between peers, which has continuously inspired solutions to 
international relations problems. It is simply a principle of organization of the international 
community, which does not imply equality between subjects of international law. “It is an 
equality before the rule, not within the rule”, see Michael Cosnard, Sovereign Equality –“The 
Wimbledon Sails On” in US HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 117 
(Michael Byers et al. eds. 2003). See also Mariana Florentino Cuellar, Reflections On Sovereignty 
and Collective Security, 40 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 211 (2004) (“It [UN Charter] also incorporated a 
cluster of interrelated legal doctrines emphasizing the sovereign equality and territorial integrity 
of nations and prohibiting aggressive war among them”) [hereinafter Cuellar]              
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However, keeping in mind the lessons learnt from the failure of the League of 
Nations, the fifty-one Charter nations at San Francisco, sought a reasonable balance 
between value-based idealism and power-based realism by acknowledging the 
importance of major world powers lending their support to this effort. Thus the 
motivation behind the initial acknowledgement of the ‘powerful’ nation status was to 
ensure the support and productive involvement of some of the world’s major decision 
making states. It was in good faith believed that the greatest decision-making authority 
must lie with states having the primary responsibility for preventing a world war. This 
same authority was realized by the creation of the Security Council with its exclusive 
membership, widespread authority and discretionary veto,5 all of which were then placed 
into the hands of the aforementioned powerful states.    
This however is seen differently by different nations, for instance, the United 
States has interpreted this acknowledgement as being commemorative of the inevitable 
conclusion that “some countries would be more equal than others”.6 The attitude 
conveyed, is summarized by Edward Luck’s assertion that, “United States policymakers 
seem to care a lot less about whether their chosen courses of action are labeled as 
unilateralist or multilateralist than do their critics in other capitals.”7 This is the 
exceptionalism, which threatens the future of multilateral decision-making in the future.    
The idea of “American exceptionalism,” is generally credited to Alexis de 
Tocqueville8 and his belief that “the United States was created differently, developed 
differently, and thus has to be understood differently—essentially on its own terms and 
within its own context.”9
5 The veto was developed as the “essential glue that kept the great powers in the bargain”. See 
Remarks by the United States Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs – Kim R. 
Holmes, THE UN CHARTER: THEN AND NOW, at a Conference on "The Future of the UN and 
International Law" sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Bonn, Germany: November 
21, 2003) (available at: http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/26960.htm) [hereinafter Holmes] 
 
6 Id.  
7 See Edward C. Luck, Exceptionalism, Power and Global Architecture, Centre on Int’l Org. 
(SIPA, Columbia) paper prepared for the Conference on Emerging Global Challenges: Managing 
Interdependence in a Complex World (May31st, 2002) at 6 [hereinafter Luck]. This disregard for 
established customary international law is clearly visible in the text of the United States National 
Security Strategy (released on Sept 20th, 2002) which expressly adopted and then attempted to 
stretch (“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries”) the Webster formula, making no mention of the UN Charter (as if implying 
the pre-1945 customary right of self defense as being the applicable law), see The National 
Security Strategy of the United States, at 15 (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf) as cited in 
Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change,
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II, No. 2,  171 at 182. [Hereinafter Byers]  
 
8 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, volume II, (1970) [hereinafter 
Tocqueville]  
 
9 See BYRON SHAFER, ed., IS AMERICA DIFFERENT?, v. (1991). See also Robert Weisberg, 
Values, Violence and the Second Amendment: American Charter, Constitutionalism, and Crime,
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As much as this may seem reasonable, the idea of exceptionalism has very often 
been misconstrued to signify an imperial position conveyed not only by publicists10 but 
also by highly ranked officials.11 Such a construction of Tocqueville’s exceptionalism is 
inaccurate as the author himself proceeded to emphasize the need for developing a more 
objective outlook towards foreign cultures and civilizations by saying, “Let us cease, 
then, to view all democratic nations under the example of the American people, and 
attempt to survey them at length with their own features”.12 
While it is increasingly becoming a platitude that exceptionalism exists in 
international law, little is being said about the nature, degrees of this exceptionalism and 
their differential consequences on the international legal system. In my effort to bridge 
what I see as an oversight, this paper will seek to show how contemporary exceptionalist 
 
39 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002).  The concept has been employed mostly to explain why throughout 
its history the U.S. has not had a significant labor or socialist movements within its territory, see 
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1997).  
 
10 See Lea Brilmayer, Transforming International Politics: An American Role For the Post Cold 
War World, 64 U CIN L REV 119, 123, 127-128 (1995) (where the author has argued that the 
concept of the equality of states is a legal fiction, and that the reality of contemporary world 
politics is one of hierarchy in which hegemonic states like the U.S. should "assume the role of 
executive officer for the world community at large," or "something akin to an unelected monarch 
working in conjunction with an elected legislature" and exercise "a right to lead and, in the 
process of leadership, to do things that are forbidden to other nations"). See also Detlev Vagts, 
Hegemonic International Law, 95 AJIL 843 (2001) quoting Charles Krauthammer (“[he said] in 
Time magazine ‘America is no mere international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, 
more dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly America is in a position to reshape norms, 
alter expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and impeccable 
demonstrations of will.’”) 
 
11 See Dick Cheney (United States Secretary of Defense), DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S:
The Regional Defense Strategy (available at: http://www.informationclearinghouse.Info/pdf/naa  
pr_Defense.pdf) [hereinafter Defense draft] which has been described by David Armstrong as: 
 
“The Plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is 
unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the United 
States to maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent new 
rivals from rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for dominion 
over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the United States must be more 
powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely powerful.”
See David Armstrong, Dick Cheney’s Song of America, United States Congressional Record 
(October 10th 2002) (available at: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/American_Empire/Che 
ney's_Song_America.html) (hereinafter Armstrong)  
 
12 Tocqueville, supra note 8 at 36-7. Quite the opposite argument was made by Bloom with 
reference to contemporary higher education, when the author argued against the prima facie 
acceptance of relativism without the application of individual reason and the recognition 
prejudices, see generally ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND, (1987). 
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practices are creating a fault in the international legal order which will in turn provide a 
basis for others to argue for an overall reformulation of rules i.e. actions in contravention 
of the multilateral international legal framework would no longer need to be justified by 
manipulative rule interpretation but by a clear challenge to the very morals and standards 
on which they are built. The friction between these unilateral ambitions and the 
widespread opposition to incidents along the lines witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq (which 
perhaps indicative of a larger disaffection with the option of being exceptional as a matter 
of right) will not only undermine the interests of the international community but will 
also prove to be against the interests of even the most exceptional hegemon (which will 
ultimately find it impossible to sustain its position of global influence in the face of 
rapidly fading trust and legitimacy). Thus, conforming to the Charter paradigm and 
keeping state exceptionalism tied within multilateral restrictions is not only in the larger 
interest of global peace and security but also in the specific interest of any state seeking 
to retain its position and mandate as a global peacekeeper. In the course of this paper, I 
will seek to explore the possibilities that various kinds of exceptionalism opens up for the 
future of the international order and argue that the ends will satisfy neither the goals of 
any state(/s) nor the international community as a whole.  
I begin my inquiry by arguing that exceptionalism displayed by the United States 
and NATO (as the most powerful economic and political actors in the international 
community) has created precedents for other smaller power centers to follow suit. 
Second, I describe how this precedent may prove to be a bigger challenge than the West 
can handle because the religion and culture based exceptionalism displayed by many like 
the Islamic groups is far more dangerous, acting as it does, with absolute disregard for the 
western notions of fundamental human rights and democratic structures such a 
transparency and freedom of information (which the western exceptionalists would feel 
pressured to at least pay lip service to). In as much as I see these forces threatening the 
sanctity of the international world order,13 I would use the third portion of my paper to 
oppose the notion that international law has been breached to the significant extent that 
such cracks and consequent seepage of exceptionalism needs to become the rule rather 
than the exception. Quite to the contrary, I would contend that unilateral actions have 
begun to isolate its perpetrators shaking their legitimacy before the international 
community. 
Finally, I would conclude that the global dissent against the actions of the U.S. in 
Kosovo and Iraq are symbolic of the international community’s continued affection for 
the Charter paradigm and that the way ahead is not to pursue a rethinking of standards but 
a reinforcement of the boundaries that the Charter places upon Westphalian liberties.         
 
13 In finding a suitably broad definition of the phrase ‘international legal order’ I accept 
Professor Schachter’s description of it as being a socio-political product of convergent 
perspectives of formal authority and actual behaviour, see Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of 
International Obligation, 8 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 300-322 (1968).  
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(II) SETTING THE STAGE: Creating precedents that perpetuate breaches 
First world diplomacy has always attempted to manipulate the international legal 
system to its advantage.14 However, even till a few decades ago, the U.S. attempted to 
manipulate and stretch interpretations (in Grenada15 and Panama16) to provide legality to 
its actions.17 This in itself showed some concern on the part of the governing parties 
towards the authority of the UN and mandates of sovereign equality and collective 
security as enshrined in the Charter. The 90’s however, signaled in a new era of foreign 
policy where the concept of ‘security’ was expanded from demilitarization and 
containment to a more “forward presence”18 so as to ensure the expansion of American 
beliefs and interests.19 This transition was accurately articulated by Anthony Lake, (the 
 
14 See Byers, supra note 7 at 173, where the author cites 16th century Spain, 18th century France 
and 19th century Britain as precedents of such diplomacy.  
 
15 In Grenada (1983), the United States alleged that some American students were under threat 
and relied in part on a claimed right to protect nationals from threatened attack to justify invading 
the territory of another nation. The State Department under Reagan and Bush asserted that this 
right to protect citizens from potential harm came within Article 51's exception for self-defense. 
However, this was one of three parallel justifications provided by the U.S. and the same was 
actively condemned by a large majority of states. See W. GILMORE, THE GRENADA 
INTERVENTION, 55-64 (1984). See also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 792 (4th ed., 
1998) [hereinafter Shaw] 
 
16 In Panama (1989), the United States argued self-defense (parallel to arguments based on the 
need to restore democracy and secure the Panama Canal), once again by way of protecting its 
nationals (one American had been killed and several others allegedly harassed), see V. Nanda, 
The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AJIL 
(1990) 494, 497. See also OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir 
Arthur Watts eds.), 436 at n. 14 (vol. 1, 9th ed. 2003) [hereinafter Oppenheim]  
 
17 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, American Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-
Defense, 31:1 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101 at 113 (2003) [hereinafter O’Connell: Self-
defense]  
 
18 See Armstrong, supra note 11 (Both Cheney and Powell and his staff believed that a weakened 
Soviet Union would result in shifting alliances and regional conflict. The United States was the 
only nation capable of managing the forces at play in the world; it would have to remain the 
preeminent military power in order to ensure the peace and shape the emerging order in 
accordance with American interests. U.S. military strategy, therefore, would have to shift from 
global containment to managing less-well-defined regional struggles and unforeseen 
contingencies.)  
 
19Conservative factions in America have maintained that the purpose of the foreign policy is to 
use its military force and political power to serve the clear moral purpose of "actively promoting 
American principles of governance abroad--democracy, free markets, respect for liberty", if 
necessary by force. See William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign 
Policy, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 18, 23 (July-Aug 1996); Robert Kagan, The Benevolent Empire, 111 
FOREIGN POL. 24 (Summer 1998); Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN 
AFF. 23 (1990/1991). 
- 6 -
then National Security Adviser to Clinton’s first administration), when in describing the 
foreign policy goals of the new administration (in 1993) he argued that “the successor to 
a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement--enlargement of the world's 
free community of market democracies".20 Unfortunately this “new interventionism”21 (by 
way of enlargement) in collusion with the already prevalent exceptionalist attitude, 
initiated the undermining of the Charter paradigm enshrining state sovereignty and 
prohibiting the use of force except in self-defense. 
 
The aforementioned undermining of the UN system was assured when in June of 
1998 the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen argued that NATO would not need a 
UN Security Council authorization to intervene in Kosovo.22 This stand was later diluted 
by the then Secretary of State---Madeline Albright, when at a NATO meeting in Dec. 
1998, she said:  
 
“Let me say a word about (Security Council) mandates. NATO will in all 
cases act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, while 
continuing to address the issue on a case-by-case basis.”23 
However, an unilateralist precedent was confirmed when the attitude of 
superiority and exceptionalism allowed the US to stand above international law and the 
mandates of multilateralism as the Clinton administration followed through in its second 
term, with NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999; an abject use of force for which the 
U.S. government saw no reason to provide legal justifications to the international 
community.24 
20 Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'From 
Containment to Enlargement' delivered at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International 
Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., Sept 21, 1993, cited in Jules Lobel, 
AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 19 (Spring, 2000) [hereinafter Lobel] 
 
21 See Stephen John Stedman, The New Interventionists, 72 FOREIGN AFF 1, 4 (America and the 
World 1992-1993). 
 
22 See Remarks of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen at Los Angeles Foreign Affairs 
Council Breakfast, Federal News Service, June 29, 1998 at 10 available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Fednew File. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO and International Law After Kosovo, 22
HUM. RTS. Q. 57 at 76 (2000)[hereinafter O’Connell: Kosovo]  
 
23Id. at 79  
 
24 Id. at 115, note 69 (“The US did put on a defense at the ICJ in a case brought by Yugoslavia. 
Basically it followed the British lead and argued that the Yugoslav bombing came close to being 
justified. In the weeks before the case however, repeated calls to the Legal Adviser’s office at the 
US Dept. of state yielded promises of return calls that never came, referrals to phone nos. for 
disconnected phones and recommendations to call the office of public affairs, which had no idea 
what the request meant.”). See also Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 1
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-21 (2000). 
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Assuming the more recent statement by the US Secretary of State to be the 
practice expected from the state, the actions of the US and NATO in Kosovo were clearly 
violative of the Article 53(1) of the Charter which states 
 
“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no 
enforcement shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception 
of measures against any enemy state [i.e. any state which during WWII was 
the enemy of any signatory of the present Charter]…”25 
This is in somewhat of a direct contradiction to the initial basis for which an 
exclusive position of responsibility was given to the United States within the framework 
of the United Nations. As stated initially, the purpose of collective security within the 
mandates of the Security Council was that while the Charter believed in and sought to 
encourage the equality of all nations, they respected the practicality that without nations 
like the United States taking the initiative in war prevention, the UN may never gain 
respectability much like its predecessor. Thus while the United States (through the 
Security Council) is put in a position of authority to legislate for the international 
community as a collective, its actions as an agent for this global community must be 
bound by a basic standard of morality and accountable against the same. 
 
Immanuel Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” is a principle that exemplifies one 
such moral standard when it reasons that an agent ought to “act only according to that 
maxim by which . . . [one] can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law.”26 Under the rationale of this principle, an agent (however powerful) like the United 
States must act upon a policy only if he is willing to allow everyone else concerned, to do 
the same.27 The rationale behind this principle fits perfectly with the equality of states 
ideal since it conveys that a standard once accepted, be made applicable to all.  
An exceptionalist outlook then, would be virtually antithetic to such a standard of 
morality since a state suffering from this condition may be generally diagnosed with, 
 
25 See Charter, art. 53(1) 
26 See IMMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, (tr. Lewis White 
Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 421 as cited in JUDITH LICHTENBERG, Pre-emption 
and Exceptionalism in U.S. Foreign Policy: Precedent and Example in the International Arena in 
WARS ON TERRORISM AND IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS, UNILATERALISM, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
(Thomas G. Weiss, Margaret E. Crahan, and John Goering, eds.,) (London: 2004)[hereinafter 
Lichtenberg]  
27 While Kant’s categorical imperative was intended to be much stricter and austerely objective, a 
simpler and more subjective interpretation would imply that agents must assess the legitimacy of 
their reasons (and thereby their actions) by their willingness to accept the universalization of such 
rationale. Id. 
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“(1) A willingness to define its own path and positions within and toward international 
institutions, regardless of pressures and critiques by others;28 
(2) A proclivity for asserting the universal validity of its national values and 
practices;29 
(3) A tendency to look to domestic sources for legitimacy, even in the face of 
contradictory rulings by international bodies;30 
(4) A confidence that national policymakers have alternative ways of pursuing national 
interests and values, so that the use of multilateral institutions is generally perceived to be an 
option, not an obligation.31”32
28 This is best seen in the myriad of ways and justifications using which the United States actually 
exempts itself from certain international law rules and agreements, even ones that it may have 
played a critical role in framing, through such techniques as noncompliance; non ratification; 
ratification with reservations, understandings, and declarations; the non-self-executing treaty 
doctrine, see Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. (2003) 1479 at 
1482, 1483 [hereinafter Koh]. The latest act in furtherance of this trend being, the unsigning of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), see Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning,
55 STAN. L. REV. 2061 (2003). 
 
29 The American obsession with its First Amendment to the extent of its blatant disregard for 
economic, social and cultural human rights is made obvious by its conspicuous absence from a 
number of international human rights covenants, for instance, its refusal to ratify the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (U.N. G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49 entered into force January 3, 1976) because it does not recognize 
economic rights to housing, employment and so on. In keeping with this ideology, the U.S. has 
also refused to be party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly on Nov. 20, 1989) and the CEDAW (Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification under U.N. GAOR 34/180 on Dec.18, 1979) which are instruments dedicated to 
raising the status of women and children especially with relation to unfair labour practices 
adopted in many third world nations. On the contrary, its singular stress with respect to human 
rights has been along the lines of civil and political freedoms as advanced under the premise of its 
own Constitution. See R. Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Developments and International 
Human Rights in the Asian Context, 9 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, at 4, 17 
(2001)[hereinafter Klein].  
 
30 This has even been espoused by some American Supreme Court Justices, and typified by 
Justice Scalia's statement in Stanford v. Kentucky that the practices of foreign countries are 
irrelevant to U.S. constitutional interpretation, because, in construing open-ended provisions of 
the Bill of Rights, "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive", 492 U.S. 361, 369 
n.1 (1989) (emphasis in original) as cited in Koh, supra note 28 at 1482. Quite the opposite 
however, is argued by Justice Ginsburg when she advocates the use of a “comparative dialogue”
(citing similar assertions by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor), see Ruth Bader 
GINSBURG, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1,2 (2003). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 
2472, 2481 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342-343 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  
 
31 A common element of the Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq and Kosovo bombings was the US and 
NATO’s disregard for both international law and the United Nations. This is made obvious to the 
extent that the US Secretary of State stated that multilateralism and presumably international law, 
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It is recognized that using the above premise for identifying exceptionalism would 
lead to the characterization of the Soviet Union, China, and France as exceptionalist in 
their conduct at various periods in the UN’s history.33 However it needs to emphasized 
that none of these nations had ever possessed as much power or pomp as the present day 
United States; nor have they consistently used this exceptionalism as the unabashed basis 
of their foreign policy (that too within the folds of a multilateralist world order). Only the 
US has been able to achieve this ignoble distinction not only within but also outside the 
UN system. 
Along these lines, the U.S. in the course of flaunting its exceptionalist traits fails 
the Kantian standard on two distinct grounds: 
First, the entire point of the American exceptionalist attitude is to convey that its 
actions and reasons are above all others and cannot be judged by the generalized 
standards of international law (since it is “exceptional”). This manifesto lies at the heart 
of exceptionalism as perceived by U.S. foreign policy. The most prominent instance of 
which is found in the Dick Cheney’s controversial “Defense Planning Guidance Draft”
of 199234 wherein the United States is presented as the overarching leader of the world, 
benevolently35 forming regional alliances, enforced and maintained with permanent 
 
are means and not ends, and thus may be done without in the interest of national interests, see, for 
example, Madeline Albright, The United and the United Nations: Confrontation or Consensus?,
LXI Vital Speeches of the Day 354 (Apr 1, 1995) as cited in Lobel, supra note 20 at 36, n. 30. 
This national interest argument was used prominently once again in February of 1998 when the 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan negotiated an agreement regarding weapons inspections with 
Iraq; Madeline Albright once again presented US’s exceptionalist (and thereby unilateralist) 
stance when she said "[if] we don't like [Annan's agreement] we will pursue our national 
interests", thereby reserving the use of force as a viable option, see Dan Morgan, Administration 
Weighs Steps in Case U.N.-Iraq Deal Doesn't Satisfy U.S., Wash Post, (Feb 23,1998), A15. See 
also Luck, supra note 7 at 12 where the author has argued that while the majority support has 
backed the American Executive in its undertaking of international and multilateral obligations, a 
vocal and politically active minority of about 15% has opposed –“generation after generation” -
the expansion of international institutions and of US participation in them, largely because of 
perceived threats to national sovereignty. The proponents of this minority are no doubt absolute 
mascots of American exceptionalism in an era of eroding sovereignty.     
32 See AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: Lessons from the 
1990s, in The US and Multilateral Organizations, (Rosemary Foot, Neil MacFarlane, and 
Michael Mastanduno, eds.) (2002) as cited in Luck, supra no 7 at 8. 
 
33 See generally G.V. PLEKHANOV, Socialism and The Political Struggle (available at http://ww 
w.marxists. org/archive/plekhanov/1883/struggle/chap1.htm).   
 
34 Defense Draft supra note 11 
35 I say ‘benevolently’ to point out a declaration within the draft that exemplifies the US’s 
outspoken propensity for unilateralism -- “The perceived ability –which depends upon the actual 
ability – of the United States to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor even 
in those cases where we do not actually use it. It will not always be incumbent upon us to assume 
a leadership role. In some cases we [i.e. the US] will promote the assumption of leadership by 
others, such as the United Nations or regional organizations.” See Defense Draft, supra note 11 
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strategic installations and military presence.36 Thus the question of America’s allowing 
this reasoning (‘maxim’) to be universally applicable does not arise.  
Second, implicit in the ‘categorical imperative’ is the syllogism that the rationale 
behind the agent’s actions (the 'maxim’) should be accessible to all other parties 
concerned before the same can become universally accepted or contested (since all 
actions must be viewed from the standpoint of multilateral consensus which is the basis 
of the UN). Along these lines, what needs to be unequivocally clarified is that along with 
the tremendous authority and responsibility (that is placed on the U.S. through its 
position in the Security Council) must be attached, the greatest standard of accountability 
to the international community. In this regard, the outspoken denial of an obligation to 
justify its actions is a most unfortunate trend initiated by the U.S. which has set not only a 
most dangerous precedent but also established a damning line of thought. 
At this point, academic fairness demands that I reiterate that the danger from 
exceptionalist statehood is not limited to the particular instance of the United States.37 As 
stated earlier, the corrupter is the power of the State in “collusion” with a cultural attitude 
of inherent (or even divinely ordained) superiority.38 Rainier Baum’s “invariance 
hypothesis” alludes to how the former is capable of causing a heightened awareness of 
the latter, from a societal as well as an individual point of view. On a societal level, an 
enhancement in the economic, military and political power of the society encourages 
people to have confidence in their roots and consequently become culturally aggressive; 
while on the individual level, the increased standard of economic and political 
empowerment causes people to become more individualistic thereby weakening 
traditional bonds, heightening feelings of alienation and causing the proverbial ‘identity 
crisis’. This leads the individual to seek shelter in religion and traditional value systems 
thereby heralding cultural resurgence.39 
at 8 (“CONTINUED U.S. LEADERSHIP”). This benevolence has been echoed elsewhere as a “benign 
hegemon”, see Luck, supra note 7 at 6. 
 
36 See Defense Draft, supra note 11 at 8 (“ENDURING REQUIREMENTS” )
37 See supra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text.  
 
38 In the ‘The Origins of Satan’, Elaine Pagels traces the evolution of Satan from his roots in the 
Hebrew Bible. She explains that the evolving image of Satan served “to confirm for Christians 
their own identification with God and to demonize their opponents---first other Jews, then pagans 
and later dissident Christians called Heretics…The use of Satan to represent one’s enemies lends 
to conflict a special kind or moral and religious…in which ‘we’ are God’s people and ‘they’ are 
God’s enemies, and ours as well…Such a moral interpretation of conflict has proven 
extraordinarily effective throughout Western history in consolidating the identity of Christian 
groups”, see ROBERT JAY CLIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE, xvii (1968).  
 
39 See Rainier Baum, Authority and Identity --- The Invariance Hypothesis II, Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie, 6 (Oct. 1977), 368-369 as cited in SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER, 76 (1996) [hereinafter Huntington: 
Clash].  While the “Invariance hypothesis” traces the society’s enhanced economic, military and 
political power to an infusion of Westernization and/or modernization, such a consideration is 
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Every society, culture or civilization has an underlying belief in its superiority to 
others around it and it is this societal pride and belief in its uniqueness that Alexis de 
Tocqueville referred to as exceptionalism, one that can arise within any similarly placed 
society; the danger arises in its “collusion” with material power. In this case, it should 
suffice to say that  
 
“The fundamental problem is that America today has too much power for 
anyone’s good, including its own…the problem with American power is not 
that it is American. The problem is simply the power. It would be dangerous 
even for an archangel to wield so much power.”40 
However in recent times, the predominant danger of unilateralism has indeed 
arisen from the United States and its allies, specifically the NATO. A danger which has 
once again been initiated by the overstepping of the Charter’s mandates in pursuit of an 
exceptionalist approach to international relations and the idea of security through regional 
arrangements. 
 
Article 52 of the Charter espouses the creation of such “regional arrangements”
when it states  
 
“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action 
provided that such arrangements…and their activities are consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”41 
Having assured such a vast scope of action to regional arrangements, the Charter 
in its foresight includes provisions such as Article 52(4) wherein it clearly stresses that 
the application of Articles 34 and 35 elating to the roles of the Security Council 
[hereinafter Council] and the General Assembly [hereinafter Assembly] remain 
unaffected.42 The supremacy of the Council is reinforced by Article 53(1), which 
provides that while the Council may, “where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement 
action shall be taken…without the authorization of the Security Council”. Moreover, 
while Article 24 of the Charter is explicit in placing upon the Council the “primary 
 
largely inconsequential for the purposes of the argument made in this paper since the major 
premise on which the “collusion” argument bases itself is the idea that once a society has this 
power (and an underlying culture and value system), the combination is most likely to create a 
lineage of exceptionalist tendencies. 
 
40 See Timothy Garton Ash, The Peril of Too Much Power, N. Y. Times, (April 11, 2002) A4 at 6. 
 
41 See Charter, supra note 3 at art. 52(1). See also B. SIMMA ed., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, (Oxford: 1995) 679.   
 
42 See Shaw, supra note 15 at 729. 
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responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”; Article 103 
emphasizes that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of a UN member under 
the Charter and obligations under any other international agreement, the former will 
prevail.43 
Thus, in law there is enough and more room to doubt any justifications that 
NATO may provide for bombing Kosovo without the prior authorization of the Council.44 
Despite this, the Russian and Chinese draft resolution of March 1999 condemning NATO 
action received the support of only one other member of the Security Council, Namibia; 
the remaining 12 members voted against it.45 This refusal to condemn however cannot 
constitute an implicit authorization since Council members might acquiesce in an 
unlawful action, yet not vote to approve it if given such an opportunity prior to its 
initiation. The more hazardous implication of such a post-action ratification by the 
Council is that it would encourage members to take illegal action with the expectation 
that the Council will later acquiesce the same thereby providing the stamp of legal 
authorization.46 
(A) The message sent out… 
 
With respect to the future of decision-making though what is more important is 
the impression that survives the unilateral conduct undertaken by the NATO in its 
deliverance of Kosovo.  
 
43 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (U.S. v. 
Nicar.) (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1984, 392, 440. 
 
44 Neither NATO nor the United States offered any legal justification for their action during the 
Kosovo crisis. In the proceeding before the International Court of Justice on Yugoslavia's 
complaint, only Belgium, of the ten NATO countries, mentioned humanitarian intervention as a 
possible legal justification, see Jonathan Charney, Anticipating Humanitarian Intervention in 
Kosovo, 32 VAND. J TRANS. L 1231, 1239 (1999). Even Belgium later stated its "hope that 
resorting to force without the approval of the Security Council will not constitute a precedent", 
see Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium at the 
54th Assembly of the United Nations, 9 (available at: http://www.un.int/belgiu 
m/speech_Minister_Michel_54UNGA_ENG.html). Others, such as the United States, referred to 
violations of human rights in Kosovo and the need to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, yet did 
not argue for a rule of international law that would justify NATO's action, see Lobel, supra note 
20 at 33. 
 
45 See Ramesh Thakur, The UN and Kosovo’s Challenge of “Humanitarian Intervention”
(available at http://www.isanet.org/archive/kosovoandun.html) [hereinafter Thakur].  
 
46 See Lobel, supra note 20 at 31. This rationale for intervention receives a most unfortunate 
endorsement from the International Court of Justice which in the Corfu Channel case noted that 
since the right of forcible intervention in the name of international justice "has, in the past, given 
rise to most serious abuses . . .From the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most 
powerful states", Corfu Channel Case, 1949 ICJ Reports (Merits) 4, 35(1949). This however is 
based on a faulty premise since the misuse of forcible intervention has more often than not been 
done by such “most powerful States”.    
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In India, a former Foreign Secretary noted: “If it is Iraq and Yugoslavia today, it 
could very well be India tomorrow. This demonstrates convincingly the importance of 
India’s nuclear deterrent.”47 
Alexei G. Arbatov (deputy chair of the Russian State Duma (Parliament) Defense 
Committee) summed up the lessons that Russia had learnt from the experience as being; 
that the ends justifies the means, that the use of force is the most efficient problem solver, 
if applied decisively and massively; that negotiations are of dubious value and should be 
used as a cover for military action and finally, that devastation and collateral fatalities 
among the civilian population are acceptable in order to limit one’s own casualties.48 
What is possibly even more disturbing is the precedent set by the Kosovo incident 
based on which it has been argued that NATO’s attack on Serbia may have effectively 
expunged a Russian taboo against the use of military force in Chechnya.49 As flagrant as 
this argument may sound, it holds good when tested against Kant’s “categorical 
imperative” since the universal applicability of the rule would allow organizations like 
the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS, with Russia as its hegemon],50 the 
Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS, with Nigeria as its hegemon],51 
or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC, with India as its 
hegemon]52 to pursue regional security and intervention based on some similarly 
customized and subjective thumb rule.53 
47 See MUCHKUND DUBEY, The NATO Juggernaut: Logic of an Indian Defense Deterrent, The 
Times of India (Delhi: 8 April 1999). See also Might on Show, The Times of India, (2 April 1999) 
arguing that “The war unleashed by NATO against Serbia has implications for general staff 
establishments the world over…The nations which want to retain their strategic autonomy and 
sovereignty are left with no choice but to sustain their nuclear arsenals and go in for missiles and 
try to develop RMA [the revolution in military affairs] capabilities for themselves”. 
 
48 See Alexei G. Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned 
from Kosovo and Chechnya (Washington DC: The George C. Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, 20 
July 2000), “Executive Summary,” v.  
 
49 Id. 
 
50 Dec.8, 1991 (Minsk) and Dec. 21, 1991 (Alma Mata); Text in (1992) 31 ILM 138. The Charter 
was adopted on June 22, 1993; see (1995) 34 ILM 1279. 
 
51 Formally established in 1975 (there was an earlier interim agreement of May 4, 1967, 5 
U.N.T.S. 287, but the constituent body was extensively revised on Jule4, 1993; Final text in 35 
(1996) 674). 
 
52 Charter of the SSARC, Dec. 8 1985 (available at: www.south-asia.com/saarc/charted.html).  
 
53 See Lobel, supra note 20 at 31 where the author cites the example of the atmosphere of 
insecurity and doubt that was created regarding the Security Council, when the Nigerian-
dominated ECOWAS intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone to protect human rights and 
democracy at the same time that the Nigerian dictatorship was violating those rights and 
democratic principles at home. The Security Council's failure to explicitly authorize those 
interventions may well have been linked to uneasiness about Nigeria's role, particularly in the 
Sierra Leone case where Nigeria apparently misled the Council as to the nature of its operations. 
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An adequate warning was provided in March 2002, when the members of the 
Arab League [League]54 concluded that the anticipated attack on Iraq would be an act of 
aggression. They further announced that any such attack would be treated as an attack on 
each and every one of them.55 The phraseology of this statement is only too similar to the 
founding principle of the NATO by which the members agree and accept that an “attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North America” would be considered to be an 
attack against them all.56 
Proponents of the American hegemonic doctrine and members of the Dick 
Cheney/Paul Wolfowitz school of thought will no doubt argue that the League lacks the 
military power and political influence to undertake such a determination to any realistic 
degree of success. However, their current strength or ability to follow through is not in 
question. The question raised is whether the NATO’s unilateral determination and 
consequent disproportional intervention into Kosovo in 1999 establishes an adequate 
precedent/rule for the League to make its own determination that Israel is indeed guilty of 
gross human rights violations against Palestinian citizens.57 Would it be acceptable to 
NATO (with the US as its hegemon) if the League used this determination as a thumb 
rule to intervene against Israel, in defense of the Palestinian peoples?58 The obvious 
answer once again presents the face of collective exceptionalism that has been NATO’s 
binding force for some time now. 
 
All of this may seem like a conspiracy theory of sorts in the background of Luck’s 
opinion that 
 
“Historically, if one state appeared to be outstripping its neighbours and 
competitors in terms of the core attributes of power, especially militarily, the 
 
Other regional actions, such as the U.S.-dominated OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic, 
the Organization of East Caribbean States/U.S. invasion of Grenada, and the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, all raise the same hegemonic pretextual concerns. 
54 Pact signed on March 22, 1945; text in (1945) 39 AJIL Supp. 266. 
 
55 See Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big 
Invasion Next Year, N.Y.Times, (Apr. 28, 2002) at 1. 
 
56 See Article V of the NATO treaty (43 AJIL 1949 Supp. 159)  
 
57 “If this war [referring to President Bush’s war against terrorism] takes the form that affronts 
moderate Arab opinion, if it has the air of a clash of civilizations, there is a strong risk that it will 
contribute to Osama Bin Laden’s goal: a conflict between the Arab-Muslim world and the West”, 
see Christopher S. Raj, Chintamani Mahapatra, US Strategic Response to Emerging Problems in 
Asia, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Vol. 41, No. 3 (2004) 279 at 295 quoting the French daily Le 
Monde, (September, 2001). 
 
58 See Thakur, supra note 45, (“would [the US] accept former or present Israeli leaders being put 
on trial for crimes against humanity by a tribunal that was set up essentially by the Arab League, 
funded by them and dependent on them for collecting crucial evidence through national 
intelligence assets and for enforcement of arrest warrants?”) 
 
- 15 -
others would react by…forming coalitions to counter the hegemon. But it 
seems most likely that others by and large see the US as a relatively benign 
hegemon, one which has little stomach or motivation for conquest and which 
faces internal constraints on the sudden and capricious use of force.”59
The fallacy of the above stated argument however lies in the fact that the US (in 
this case) is indeed not a “benign hegemon”.60 Neither does it lack the “stomach or 
motivation” to pursue conquest nor does its foreign policy get bound by any such 
“internal constraints on the sudden and capricious use of force”61 and this fact is only too 
obvious to most nations. Thus the world is a little more the way Huntington sees it; as a 
“transitional uni-polar period” characterized by a single superpower preferring unipolar 
hegemony, and several regional powers that prefer a multipolar system wherein they 
could restrain the superpower.62 
59 See Luck, supra note 7 at 6. See also Fernando Reinares, The Empire Rarely Strikes Back,
FOREIGN POLICY (Jan./Feb., 2002) where the author contends, “Although terrorists attacked U.S. 
interests more than 2,400 times between 1983 and 1998, the United States responded with overt 
military action only three times.”
60 See Slavoj Zizek, Iraq’s False Promises, FOREIGN POLICY, (Jan/Feb 2004) 42 at 46, where he 
argues that “The problem with today’s United States is not that it is a new global empire, but that, 
while pretending to be an empire, it continues to act as a nation-state, ruthlessly pursuing its 
interests”.  
 
61 See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118: 7 HARV. L. REV. 2048 at 2054, 2057-58 (2005) where the authors contend that 
“Congress need not declare war in order to provide its full authorization to the President to 
prosecute a war”. This is followed by the argument that any authorization for the use of military 
force is not truncated on the gorunds that the fight against terrorists is not a real war; rather “the 
authority conferred [by the authorization of use of military force] does not depend on whether the 
conflict meets some metaphysical test of war but rather on how the political branches view the 
conflict and how they characterize the belligerents in it”. These arguments however are widely 
disputed; see n. 32, 33 at 2058, citing not only the intent of the Founders but also the conduct of 
previous U.S. Presidents contrary to the above stated argument. Contemporary literature on the 
subject also disputes the legality of such executive arrogance for e.g. see, Bruce Ackerman The 
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263 (2004).  
What is perhaps even more surprising is the Sept 18, 2001 Congress authorization to the 
U.S. President to “use all necessary and appropriate force…to prevent future acts of 
international terrorism against the U.S. by such nations, organization or persons”, see 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001),. [hereinafter 
AUMF]. The AUMF was approved by both Houses of the Congress on Sept 14, 2001 and signed 
by the President on the Sept 18, 2001. It was this unilateral and preemptive carte blanche that 
trained U.S. might on Iraq----On Sept 20, 2001, President Bush declared “Our enemy is a radical 
network of terrorists, and every government that supports them…”, see President George W. 
Bush, Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept 20, 2001) 
(available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).             
 
62 See Samuel Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 35 (Mar-Apr 1999). 
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The obvious reason to explain the absence of a coalition to counter such a 
hegemon (and its allies in the NATO) is the degree to which the international political 
system is influenced and often manipulated by the hegemon and its allies.63 An example 
 
63 The most recent instance of which is America’s declaration of Pakistan as being its major non-
NATO ally in recognition of the latter’s services as a bounty hunter of sorts, arresting and 
handing over more than 500 fugitives alleged to be part of the Al Quaeda and Taliban factions. 
See U.S. to Designate Pakistan Non-NATO Ally, Reuters (posted: March 18th 2004), (available 
at: http://wireservice.Wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=Breaking&storyId=837158). See also 
US Boosts Pakistan Military Ties (available at: http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world /south _a 
sia/3522174.stm). 
This designation has been accompanied by the lifting of all sanctions levied upon 
Pakistan after Pervez Musharraf seized power in a 1999 bloodless coup; since September 11, 
2001, the US has rewarded Pakistan’s cooperation in the war against terrorism by helping the 
country reschedule its loans with international financial institutions, see “US assures Pakistan of 
Immediate Debt Relief”, Dawn (Oct. 21st 2001).  See also “US Lifts Musharraf Sanctions”, The 
Telegraph, (March 26th 2004) (“the US President had last year announced a $3 billion economic 
assistance package for Pakistan, including over a billion dollars to enable it to repay old leans.”) 
See also B. RAMAN, “Murder and Machination in Pakistan’s backyard”, (July 9th 2003) (available 
at: http://www.pakistan-facts.com/article.php/200 307081252 40298) (The Pakistani conducted 
arrest and handover of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed allegedly the chief of operations under Bin 
Laden, charged with planning the attack of September 11th, was seen as the biggest catch of Al-
Quaeda. The performance earned President Musharraf accolades at Camp David and led to the 
announcement of a $3 billion aid package from 2005). 
 To this extent there is the possibility of a deviation from Huntington’s description of how 
the fault lines of civilizational conflict will be drawn between “the West and the rest”, (see 
Huntington: Clash, supra note 37 at 22-49) since Pakistan’s newfound boldness in siding with the 
US against Islamic militants within its territory is a prime example of the indecisiveness that 
continues to plague Non-western unity. (See M. LAL GOEL, A Clash of Civilizations, speech 
delivered at the Unitarian Universalist Fellowship of Pensacola, Florida (June, 2002) at 9,10 (on 
file with the author) where he states “The quick eradication of the Bin Laden network in 
Afghanistan has emboldened President Musharaff to move boldly against militants in his own 
country. Musharraf would not have undertaken such a risky venture prior to 9/11. In the changed 
environment he feels encouraged. The moderate Islamic intelligentsia has begun to speak up 
against extremism”) 
Pakistan as an Islamic theocracy could have served as a stronghold of an Islamic 
resistance against the West. However the presence of the US as a negotiator in the Kashmir issue 
has thus far precluded Pakistan’s siding against them, see generally ASHLEY J. TELLIS, C. 
CHRISTINE FAIR, JAMISON JO MEDBY, LIMITED CONFLICT UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA:
INDIAN AND PAKISTANI LESSONS FROM THE KARGIL CRISIS, (Rand Coporation Publications, 
2000) (available at: www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1450). Pakistan has consequently 
attempted to balance its cultural allegiance with its foreign political interests for some time now, 
see KATHERINE PFLEGER SHRADER, U.S. Lets Pakistan Lead al-Quaeda Hunt, The Guardian 
(March 19th 2004) (available at: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1101590/posts) (“The 
situation Musharraf faces is a delicate one, as he balances his desire to eliminate al-Quaeda and 
its allies, who have found safety in the tribal areas of Pakistan, with opposition among his people 
to the U.S.-led war on terror…Loren Thomson a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute…said 
Musharaff is in a dangerous situation, under U.S. pressure and having survived two attempts on 
his life by Islamic extremists, ‘He appears to be doing the bidding of the United States at a time 
when U.S. standing in Pakistan is at a low ebb.’”) This new alliance however has shown adequate 
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of this with regard to the NATO, is seen in the “Strategic Concept of the Alliance” which 
was approved by the 19 members on its 50th anniversary (April, 1999).64This policy 
essentially transforms the NATO from a Cold War collective security organization to 
“…one that attaches more importance to political dimensions and expanded 
geographical focus beyond NATO territory”.65 But in the course of its most ambitious 
expansion throughout Europe66 (and even beyond through sub-alliances),67 the NATO 
(and the US as a controlling authority within it) may have set a most dangerous precedent 
and another significant oversight; in believing themselves to be god’s only children. 
 
(III) A MORE DANGEROUS TWIN: The threat of a religious, cultural exceptionalism 
 
Islam for instance, grew out from being a threatened belief in Mecca in 622 A.D. 
(when Mohammed was forced to flee to Medina) to become a predominant international 
force with boundaries that stretched from India (712 A.D.) to Spain (715 A.D.), all within 
 
potential to become a cause of dangerous acrimony for Pakistan within the bounds of its own 
Islamic community. See “Zawahiri Tape Urges Pervez Overthrow”, The Telegraph, (26th March 
2004) (Dubai, March 25: Arabic Al Jazeera today aired a purported new tape of senior Al Quaeda 
leader Ayman-al-Zawahri proclaiming ‘I call on Muslims in Pakistan to get rid of their of their 
government which is working for Americans.’); PETER MAASS, Dirty War, NEW REPUBLIC (11th 
Nov. 2002) at 18 (“Arbitrary arrests and executions carried out by unloved governments at the 
bidding of the unloved United States, can lead to those governments being replaced by ones that 
support the terrorists instead”); Dexter Filkins, “As Pakistani Popularity Slides, ‘Busharaf’ Is a 
Figure of Ridicule”, New York Times, 5th July 2002, A1. See also KANCHAN LAKSHMAN, Deep 
Roots to Pakistan’s Sectarian Terror, (July 8th 2003) (available at: http://www.pakistan-
facts.com/article.php/200307081252 40298) (“The incident [involving a successful suicide 
bombing in Quetta] comes in the wake of increasing Islamist fundamentalist/extremist opposition 
to his regime's current engagement with the United States. Islamists may have intended to send a 
message regarding their uneasiness with Musharraf's current agenda.”) See generally RAMSEY 
CLARKE, Divide and Conquer, The Destruction of the Balkan Federation by the United States 
and NATO, (Nov 3rd 2003) (available at: http://www.Iacenter.Org /yugo/div ide&conquer.htm). 
 
64 See “The Alliance Strategic Concept”, NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April24, 1999 
(available at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm). This agreement effectively redefines 
the Cold War alliance’s mission to address a wide range of potential threats (including regional 
threats) ranging from WMD proliferation to international terrorism.   
 
65 See Dingli Shen, Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats?, 27:2 THE WASHINGTON 
QUARTERLY, (Spring 2004), 165 at 168. 
 
66 See Thakur, supra note 45 describing the NATO’s triple transformation policy i.e. enlargement 
of membership, an eastward expansion of geographical borders, and a change of role from 
collective defense of member-states against armed attack from a non-member, to a more diffuse 
role of peace maintenance throughout Europe.  
 
67 See US Boosts Pakistan Military Ties (available at: http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world /south _a 
sia/3522174.stm) (“In effect, Pakistan now joins a club of 10 or so militarily most-favoured 
nations that include Israel, Egypt and Jordan among them.”) 
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the next century.68 This wave of conquest continued three centuries later with the 
overrunning of Anatolia (Turkey, 1071), Delhi (1201) and Constantinople (1453); to the 
growing numbers of followers of Islam, these victories against the greatest of odds 
represented God’s pleasure at them and his displeasure at the non-believers. It gave them 
boundless faith in their cause leading to the creation of one of the most dangerous 
exceptionalist beliefs to have ever come into existence.69 The primary tenet of Islamic 
theology is “La Ilaha Ill Allah, wa Anna Mohammed Ar-Rasul Allah” which translates to 
“there is no other God but Allah, and Mohammed is the messenger of Allah”.70 This 
represents a linear stream of thought most susceptible to exceptionalist tendencies 
especially in the face of an openly corruptive influence coupled with military aggression 
from the west.   
 
Some of the crucial questions that need answering at this stage would be---is there 
not enough authority (by way of precedent) for Islamic groups to act unilaterally in 
defense of their security interests; will diplomatic considerations (i.e. the rule observed 
by Pakistan, Jordan and Bahrain) survive the fervor that accompanies a cultural 
confidence (that norm in say, Iran)? Will the buffers created by the West (in bestowing 
upon four Islamic strongholds, the charge of ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’)71 prove an 
adequate safety net to prevent or (in the worst case) outlast an Islamic resurgence? The 
censure displayed by Jordan at the assassination of the spiritual leader of the Hamas---
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin 72 and King Abdullah’s consequent hasty departure from the 
 
68 Mohammed himself captured Mecca before 632 A.D. Within 2 years of this, Muslim raiders 
had defeated and thereby conquered the Persian and Byzantium empires (the two most powerful 
empires in existence at the time). See DANIEL PIPES, In the Path of God: Islam and Political 
Power, Voice of India (Delhi, 2001) [hereinafter Pipes] where the author states that the “It 
seemed that, armed with faith of Allah, nothing could stop the soldiers of Islam.”
69 “Islam’s rapid rise from obscurity to international empire had a touch of the miraculous for 
Muslims; how could they have attained all this without the God’s approval and support”, Id. The 
danger in Islamic exceptionalism may be even more severe since it is seemingly divinely 
ordained as opposed to its American counterpart, which stems from a way of life. 
 
70 See M. Lal Goel, A Clash of Civilizations, speech delivered at the Unitarian Universalist 
Fellowship of Pensacola, Florida (June, 2002) at 6 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Goel] 
 
71 Title 10 U.S. Code, Sec. 2350a (Nunn Amendment 1987), authorizes the Secretary of Defense 
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to designate Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA) 
for purposes of the code. See Praful Bidwai, Manufacturing Saffron Support, FRONTLINE, Vol. 
21:7 (March 21-April 9, 2004) (available at:  http://www.flonnet.com/fl2107/stories/2004040900 
4811 900.htm).   
 
72 See “Jordan Condemns Yassin Assassination”, Petra News Agency, 22nd March, 2004 
(available at: http://www.jorda nembassyus.Org/0 3222004001.htm).  
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United States in dissent73 of the US’s condoning the killing74 is possibly one instance of 
the gaps in the Western buffer strategy.   
The appreciable danger in this arises from the probability that an Islamic 
resurgence would flow primarily from a heightened anxiety within the community on the 
issue of a threat to their culture and way of life.75 This is possibly the most lethal and 
uncontrollable form of exceptionalism, one that arises to protect community value 
systems. History is testament to the Russian, Chinese revolutions and the Nazi conquests 
during the Second World War which saw the return, in a magnified form, of the kind of 
brutality that characterized the religious wars of the sixteenth century, for what was at 
 
73 See “Jordan King Signals Rift with US”, BBC News-World Edition, 20th April, 2004 (available 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3641099.stm) (“King Abdullah of Jordan has 
postponed talks with US President George W Bush on Wednesday amid concern over America's 
support for Israeli policy.”); “King Condemns the Assassination of Hamas Leader”, Petra News 
Agency, 22nd March, 2004 (available at: http://www.jordanembass yus.org/03222004009.htm).  
 
74 See “US vetoes UN measure on Yassin's death”, CHINAdaily, 26th March, 2004 (available at: 
http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/26/content_318213.htm), quoting the U.S. 
Ambassador John Negroponte, "This Security Council does nothing to contribute to a peaceful 
settlement when it condemns one party's actions and turns a blind eye to everything else 
occurring in the region". (The vote was 11 countries in favor, three countries abstaining, and one 
country against — the United States); See also “U.S. says it's ‘deeply troubled’ by Yassin 
killing…But White House doesn't condemn Israel outright”, MSNBC News, March 22nd,
2004 (available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4579 005/). See also “World fears after 
Yassin killing”, BBC News—UK Edition, 22nd March, 2004 (available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_eas t/3556559. stm) (“The Bush administration said it 
was deeply troubled by the assassination, though it stopped well short of condemning it.”) 
 
75“Terrorist leaders tell young men that the reason they feel humiliated---personally and 
culturally---is that international institutions like the IMF, World Bank and the UN are imposing 
capitalism and secular ideas on them with the aim of exterminating traditional values”, see 
JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD---Why Islamic Militants Kill?, 283 (2003) 
[hereinafter Stern]. This anxiety is not a new emotion. Frustrated by the largely unidirectional 
surge of cultural infiltration into its territory, the Islamic Republic of Iran tried to block out 
television programming through the implementation of a statute (in 1994), which disallowed the 
use of Satellite Programme Receivers within the territory of the State. This extreme form of 
restrictive State action was primarily motivated by the belief that:   
 
“They [the West] wish to impoverish us and to impose the wrong and 
hollow culture of the West, which deprives people of any kind of 
humanity.... The bulk of the enemy onslaught against us, against our brave 
nation, is a cultural onslaught…”  
 
See Majlis Official Comments on Bill Banning Use of Satellite Programme Receivers, BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 20, 1994, LEXIS, News Library, BBCMIR File (excerpting 
weekly radio programme, entitled "The Nations House," on December 18, 1994 and broadcast on 
the Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran), quoted in PAUL D. CALLISTER, The Internet, Regulation 
and the Market for Loyalties: An Economic Analysis of Transboundary Information Flow, (2002) 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 59 at note 127. 
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stake was not just territory and resources, but the value systems and ways of life of entire 
populations.76 
Prudence also requires one to be mindful of the fact that the history of Islamic 
propagation tells a tale of vengeful crusades and systematic proselytization all of which 
arise from a sense of innate cultural righteousness, the duty of god’s own children as it 
were.77 The heat of this emotion is so smelting that it spares no one, not even its own 
people who in the eyes of the resurgence may have swayed from the ideals of the original 
austere Islamic faith78 which gives them the locus to be exceptional.79 
Present day western virtues will on the other hand, not blindly allow the State to 
pursue activities in violation of the general principles of civil, political rights and 
liberties. The all-pervasive principles of transparency, public participation and 
democratic governance structures ensure the protection of the public from governmental 
extremism.80 These self-imposed checks on not only the domestic functioning of the State 
 
76 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, 11 (1992) [hereinafter 
Fukuyama]. 
 
77 Possibly the best instances of such unbounded Islamic exceptionalism can be seen in its spread 
across Europe with the Crusades and the overrunning of Hijaz by the Wahhabi resurgence of 
1924, see TARIQ ALI, THE CLASH OF FUNDAMENTALISMS, 75, 76 (2003) [hereinafter Tariq]. 
While the earlier Wahhabi conquests of the Shammar region in  1915-1917 might be explained by 
the pro-Ottoman attitude of the ruling Al Rashid family; and the occupation of the districts of 
Abha in Asir might also be represented as a ‘matter of domestic policy’ and as the settling of 
unsolved border problems, the occupation of virtually international areas around the holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina required an entirely different rationale, especially in view of the fact that both 
the Hijaz and the Najd had concluded a defense treaty with the United Kingdom and received 
considerable subsidies under its terms. Thus, throwing up such a blatant defiance in the face of 
the world’s greatest colonizer required something more than mere military strength; an 
unquestioning belief that their actions were guaranteed and held safe by divine will. A belief with 
which “…they advanced at some speed towards Mecca, plundered the city and destroyed all the 
symbols of the ‘heathen’ practices of the Meccans’”, see REINHARD SCHULZE, A MODERN 
HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD 69, 70 (2000).  
 
78 Sayyid Qutub (considered by many to be the father of modern Islamic extremism), targeted 
secular Arab leaders (because he found them to be “arrogant, corrupt, Westernized princes and 
autocrats”) through a jihad, finding support for his condemnation of them in the writings of Ibn-
Taymiyya, a 13th century theologian and jurist who wrote that jihad against Muslim unbelievers 
was a legitimate means of protecting the purity of the faith. Outub described internal jihad as a 
necessary component of the permanent evolution of the Islamic movement. See RUDOLPH 
PETERS, JIHAD IN CLASSICAL AND MODERN ISLAM, 44 (1996) [Hereinafter Peters] 
 
79 The writings of Sayyid Qutub and the Muslim Brotherhood (for which he became the 
spokesman) inspired not only the Egyptian Islamic Jihad but many of the present day Islamic 
terrorists like the Al Quaeda and the Hamas, see Stern, supra note 75 at 46. 
 
80An example of this is the much debated exclusionary principle used in U.S criminal procedure: 
Since its inception in Weeks v. U.S. (1914) (232 U.S. 383) the principle has been a guardian of the 
4th and 5th amendments (see Justice Black dissenting in Mapp v. Ohio, (1961) 367 U.S. 643 at 
662), as a guarantee of privacy (see Olmstead v. U.S. (1928) 277 U.S. 438 at 478), as necessary to 
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but also its foreign policy and international conduct, serve to significantly limit the extent 
to which exceptional activities may be pursued by the State.81 This weakness of any 
modern, democratically structured member of the international community does not exist 
in the case of States or communities that derive their requisite legitimacy from a religious 
ideology or divine right.82 While a democracy remains weakened in its effort to preserve 
a sphere of individual rights (which significantly delimit the state’s powers), such 
authoritarian (ideologically or by religious/cultural fervor) regimes have the option of 
sacrificing specific aspects of individual rights and freedoms to facilitate the greater 
purpose for which they exist. 83 
This cultural/religious basis of Islamic exceptionalism provides its actions with 
more endurance and less regard for the western social ideals of liberty and equality that 
the West has to uphold, at least in principle.84 This redundancy of social accountability or 
 
assure the accused of a fair trial (see Justice Frankfurter in Irvine v. California (1954) 347 U.S. 
128 at 148) and a vanguard of the standard better known as the ‘imperative of judicial integrity’
whereby the government cannot take advantage of its own failings (Elkins v. U.S. (1960) 364 U.S. 
206 at 217). Another instance is provided by Fareed Zakaria when he argues that democracy 
without the protections of constitutional liberalism and due process, is a farce, see FAREED 
ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM, 17-19 (London, 2003) [Hereinafter Zakaria].  
 
81 See Fukuyama, supra note 76 at 9, where the author states, “They [Democracies] are 
hamstrung by their very democratic nature: by the plurality of their voices, the self-doubt and 
self-criticism that characterize democratic debate”. Thus a state which avoids such interventions 
into its functioning would be stronger than a democracy and consequently free to map out its 
foreign policy without the hindrance which in the opinion of Tocqueville plagues democracies. 
See also JEAN FRANCOIS REVEL, How Democracies Perish, 17 (New York: 1983) [hereinafter 
Revel], where the author continues the criticism originally made popular by Tocqueville, “As 
things stand, relatively minor causes of discontent corrode, disturb, unsettle, paralyze, the 
democracies faster and more deeply…[than Communist regimes], whose subjects have no real 
rights or means of redressing their wrongs. Societies of which permanent criticism is an integral 
feature are the only livable ones, but they are also the most fragile”. Even though Revel uses the 
argument in the context of communist society, the analogy would hold good for an Islamic state 
which denies western democratic processes to its citizens.  
 
82 The Wahhabi movement for instance, began in the early 18th century with the coalition of 
Muhammad ibn-Abdul Wahhab and the martial strength of Muhammad Ibn-Saud, whereby Saud 
became the emir—the political leader while Wahhab took on the role of a sheik (the religious 
leader). This new found “religious legitimacy” allowed a fatwa to be issued against all non-
Wahhabis because Saud’s forces were “no longer a mob of traveling thugs and his victims were 
no longer innocent people. Now Ibn-Saud’s goons were ‘fighters for jihad’ authorized to murder 
‘unbelievers’”, see Abdul Hadi Palazzi, “Orthodox Islamic perceptions of Jihad and Martyrdom”
cited in Stern supra note 75 at 315, n.13. 
 
83 See Fukuyama, supra note 76 at 15. 
 
84 See Klein, supra note 29 at 17-45, where the author discusses the Asian cultural relativist 
argument against the universal applicability of international human rights standards as 
represented by ‘western’ codifications such as the UDHR and the ICCPR.  
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responsibility towards democratic values and civil, political rights in the eyes of the 
Islamic exceptionalist provides him with more than enough elbow room to identify and 
persecute members even within his own community85 if their actions or opinions are seen 
to contradict or differ from the austere edicts of Islamic virtue.86 
(A) The Changing dimensions of “enemy” 
 
An extension of this problem that needs to be acknowledged is the legal 
personality of the actors through whom Islamic exceptionalism is conveyed. While 
international law has always been strict about the status of its actors,87 present day 
conflicts bypass such a rationale of restricting the law only to nation States.88 The actors 
perpetuating invasions, armed attacks and so on are very often not states but non-state 
actors like militia, which may or may not be state endorsed.89 The pervasion of 
technology and information has led to an overall decentralization of power, which has 
trickled down so far that there is what Fareed Zakaria calls a “democratization of 
violence” whereby an individual non-state actor has the capacity to effectively attack 
States.90 This situation is far worsened by international law’s state centric approach 
 
85 The fervor of Wahhabism (attempting to replace orthodox Islam with their puritanical doctrine) 
was so severe that a jihad was proclaimed against the Ottoman Empire whose Sultan was 
considered the heir of the prophet Muhammad and the highest Islamic authority, see Stern, supra 
note 75 at 68.  
 
86 See Peters, supra note 78, The Wahhabiya resurgence brought on by the austere religious 
beliefs of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and propagated by the military strength of the bandit 
Emir – Muhammad Ibn Saud spread rapidly, conquering areas where it felt the original edicts of 
Islam had been corrupted by idol worship, shrines and gravestones (the Wahhabi movement 
rejected all forms of religious ostentation since all Muslims are equal before Allah). In its stride, 
the Saudi-Wahhabi forces conquered and subjugated Najd (1745-45), Riyadh, Kharj and Qasim 
(1792), Karbala (1801) where they looted and killed 5000 people, destroying homes and shrines 
alike. In 1802 they occupied Taif (where they massacred the population) and Mecca (1803)  
(where they instructed the Sharif to destroy the tombs of the Prophet and the Caliphs), see TARIQ,
supra note 77. 
87 See SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS, 21 (Viva Books: New 
Delhi, 2005). See also ALLAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY, 30 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
 
88 See Gregor Noll, Force, Partisanship, Dislocation: An essay on International Law in the State 
of the Exceptional, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (JARNA 
PETMAN and JAN KLABBERS eds.) (Martti Koskenniemi, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, 
2003) 207 at 213. [Hereinafter Noll] 
 
89 Id. (where the author states “Yet, as long a the non-state actor manager to hide behind third 
states, and remains on their territory, the question imposes itself against whom to exercise right 
to self-defense. Going for the non-state perpetrators would need the consent of the government on 
whose territory they are present.”)   
 
90 See Zakaria, supra note 80 at 16.  
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which often fails to adequately address non-state actors who may have liberated 
themselves from the restraints of a particular territory and consequently operate through a 
globalized form of warfare. The resulting asymmetric warfare leads one to wonder just 
how unfair the U.S. doctrine (allowing the pre-emptive use of force)91 happens to be. Can 
the UN system with its state centric premise still provide security for all? The precedents 
set for exceptional unilateralism on the part of the western states, the attempts and 
aspirations of other states/sub-state groups to use the same (for their own ends or to 
counter a perceived western imperialism) and the increased involvement of non-state 
actors (as conduits of such counter exceptionalism), creates a situation where not only the 
personality of the parties, the merits of their actions but the morality and usefulness of the 
law itself comes into question.92 
While it is perhaps still too early to condemn the working of the UN system, this 
present challenge to its veracity may be used to draw up two scenarios: 
 
The first, is one where unilateral actions (for instance, the doctrine of pre-emptive 
force) get legitimized as an option to any state (or to some states only), and where the 
complex mechanism of pacific settlement of disputes, prohibition against the use of force, 
non-intervention are subverted; where exceptionalism gets labelled as nationalism or 
democratic intervention on the one hand and terrorism on the other. The second, is where 
the international order embarks on a return to the Charter paradigm of international 
relations and provides states with the initiative to formulate foreign policies aimed at self- 
improvement with due regard for the principles of sovereign equality and non-
intervention.  
 
(IV) IMAGINING ENDGAMES: Is this the end of the Charter Paradigm? 
Firstly, while a doctrinal approach to international law would make it fairly easy to 
denounce the legality of the former scenario, the question of fairness is a different issue. 
Leaving aside ambitions of abject expansionism; how does a proud, efficient, ‘free’, State 
defend itself against unnamed armies/militia, for whose actions, no state takes 
responsibility?93 How does it counter a challenge to its proud existence a challenge other 
than to leave a message on the door stressing its intent to use pre-emptive force94 if 
 
91 In situations where the state faces unknown enemies whose presence, movement and actions it 
cannot predict of even reliably acknowledge, the readiness to resort to the pre-emptive self-
defense would serve to greatly increase the credibility of a threat levied by the state against such 
potential threats. See Id. at 8.    
 
92 See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, FOR REASONS OF STATE, 19, 20 (2003). 
 
93 See Lawrence Freedman, War, FOREIGN POLICY (July/August, 2003) at 16 (where the author 
contends that “All Future Warfare Will Be Asymmetric”).    
 
94 In the run up to the 2004 Presidential election, candidate John Kerry countered allegations that 
under his leadership, the U.S. would have to pass a “global test” to use preemptive strike, by 
arguing that he would reserve "the right to preempt in any way necessary to protect the United 
- 24 -
necessary? The obvious problem with this of course is that not only does it wash away 
the structure of multilateral/consensus based security systems but also that, in a sense, it 
will perpetuate conflict. While a state’s aggression may be called its exceptionalism, 
similar actions undertaken by a militia would be labelled fanatic terrorism. Gregor Noll,
speaks of how  
 
“Unlike the conventional enemy (in an interstate war), terrorists represent an 
‘absolute enemy’ in the Schmittian sense, and the struggle against it is 
informed by the logic of annihilation”.95 
His reasoning (alluding to Schmitt’s categorization of a ‘just enemy’ and an 
‘absolute enemy’)96 neglects the ‘partisan’ whose conduct may have been initiated in 
protection of his home territory (i.e. of a “telluric character”)97but whose ambitions are 
fuelled further by a religious/cultural/political or economic exceptionalism98 which 
provides them with a global agenda99 (as evidenced by an “increased intensity of political 
 
States," see Dana Milbank, “Bush Says Kerry Will Allow Foreign Vetoes”, Washington Post, (3rd 
October, 2004), A08 (available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2933-
2004Oct2.html) . See also Bill Van Auken, “Bush-Kerry debate: Two Candidates Committed to 
War”, World Socialist Website (1st October 2004)   (available at: http:// www.wsws.org/article 
s/2004/oct2004/deba-o01.shtml). 
 
95 See Noll, supra note 88 at 219 citing Carl Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen: 
Zwischenbemerkungen zum Begriff des Politischen, (Berlin: 1963) at 91-96.  
 
96 Schmitt distinguishes between the partisan who is defending home territory and the 
revolutionary partisan with a global agenda. The former needs not construct the enemy as an 
absolute one, to be vanquished in annihilation, but is content with the eviction of the enemy from 
the ‘occupied territory’. The latter however needs to go further and portrays the enemy in 
absolute terms, which equals victory with annihilation. See Noll, supra note 88 at 218, nt. 29.      
 
97 Id. at 9 where the author cites Schmitt’s definition of Telluric character as:  “at large, the 
authentic partisan is in a defensive situation, committed to the defence of the home territory”. 
Such a definition I feel may be allowed to include a partisan who fights not only in the defence of 
his territory but also for the culture, values and life style associated with it (for instance Islamic 
extremist groups). 
 
98 See Stern, supra note 75 at 265 (“The twin purpose of jihad is to cleanse Islam…and to fight 
against the West using political, economic and religio-cultural weapons…”). 
 
99 The Egyptian Islamic Jihad for instance, was created with the local agenda of upholding 
Islamic rights in Egypt by converting it into an Islamic state. However, in later years, sustenance 
of the group demanded the broadening of its agenda to cover and thereby counter global threats to 
the Islamic faith. Thus upon merging with Osama Bin Laden’s network, Zawahiri described the 
new mission of his group (now the core of the Al Quaeda) as a “global battle” against the 
“unbelievers” who have “united against the mujahideen”. He adds, “the battle cannot be fought 
on a regional level without taking account of the global hostility towards us”, see Stern, supra 
note 75 at 266-267.  
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commitment”).100This combination is possibly the most accurate description of the 
contemporary exceptional, be it a State or a military group. While the Al Quaeda, the 
Taliban took up arms in defence of their faith/culture (be it Wahhabism or another 
interpretation of Islam) and proceeded to take the heat to the shores of their ‘absolute 
enemies’, the US in turn exacted their pound of flesh in defence of their freedoms and 
pillars of economic and social progress by flattening the contours of Afghanistan. 
Whether or not the driving the Taliban out of power was a deed worth the effort is a 
different issue, but the natural consequence of this war abroad has been the creation of a 
license to continue it. Thus to allow States to proceed along these lines would only serve 
to feed a general trend of illegality in international relations.101 
To submit and surrender the rule of law to this “zone of indistinction between law 
and violence”102 created by a “war against terrorism” would be to hand over the world 
system to fear, unilateralism, vengeance and an overall state of exception. The war in Iraq 
gives a glimpse of a future where the “zone of indistinction” will become the norm and an 
argument for the enforcement of the rule of law through multilateralism will be an 
exception.         
 
A second prong of this argument (for allowing unilateral action in international 
law) is found in Thomas H. Lee’s challenge to the utility of the “sovereign equality of 
States” premise, when he writes that  
 
“First, it is difficult to prove that [international] stability results from 
sovereign equality per se as opposed to other system-level structural 
variables like the balance of power among the most powerful states…Second, 
whatever might be true of the multipolar or bipolar past, it is questionable 
how much sovereign equality can contribute to stability in our presumptive 
world of unipolarity and increasingly influential non-state actors.”103 
100 See Noll, supra note 88, where the author cites Schmitt’s definition of a partisan with 
‘increased intensity of political commitment’ as one who “has entered the realm of absolute 
hostility, in which interplay of terror and counter terror culminates in annihilation”.   
 
101 Id. at 216 where the author admits that “Partisan warfare evokes partisan warfare even in the 
theatre of legitimacy”, thereby leaving little room for objective judgment or placing of 
responsibility. 
 
102 Id. at 217 where the author uses the instance of the Guantanamo Bay prison facility in Cuba 
(used by the U.S. to house suspected Al Quaeda terrorists denying them the legal status of 
Prisoners of War) as being symbolic of a paradigm shift towards a state’s replication of irregular 
partisan warfare.     
 
103 See Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: 
The Vitality of Sovereign State Equality in a Unipolar World, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 
153 (August 2004). [Hereinafter Lee]  
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While it is true to say that a number of facets of international relations and 
diplomacy may influence international stability, even the balance of power (between 
“powerful states”) and the restrictions on its exercise are maintained through the principle  
of multilateral decision-making,104 which in turn draws its legitimacy from the ideal of 
sovereign equality of states.105 
It may be less than fair to say that all of international law is built on 
multilateralism: it is very much a system wherein the law is ordinarily implemented by 
states acting collectively and individually;106 to hold otherwise (i.e. to say that all inter-
 
104 The unilateral exercise of “Westphalian sovereignty” has been greatly restricted by what Ann 
Marie Slaughter describes as the “ineffectiveness” and “interference” challenges, see Ann Marie 
Slaughter, Sovereignty, Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN J. INTL. L. 283 at 284 
(2004), where the author quotes Keohane (with regard to the first challenge)—“It is now a 
platitude that the ability of governments to attain their objectives through individual action has 
been undermined by international political and economic interdependence” and argues (with 
regard to the latter challenge) “the letter of Article 2(7) remains; the sprit is violated repeatedly 
and increasingly routinely. All of Human Rights law deliberately infringes on the domestic 
jurisdiction of every state, denying governments the freedom to torture, murder, and 
‘disappear’…their own citizens. Moreover, throughout the 1900’s the Security Council 
repeatedly found that the conditions prevailing within a state, from starvation in Somalia to 
political intimidation and massacre in East Timor, a threat to international peace and security 
sufficient to require collective armed intervention…States can no longer assume that if they 
refrain from interfering in the affairs of other states, they will remain free from interference 
themselves” [hereinafter Slaughter]. See also Cuellar, supra note 4, (“…the US and its Allies 
supported the creation of an institutional arrangement that was supposed to make unprecedented 
contributions to collective international security. The UN Charter was central to that 
arrangement.”)   
 
105 It is for this reason that sovereign equality is vehemently guarded by states for it gives them 
the standing to expect and contest for “basic protections---such as the prohibition of conquest and 
the preclusion of non-consensual obligations---that help preserve their independence in 
international affairs,” see Byers, supra note 7 at 176. The acceptance of sovereign equality has 
allowed states to deny to the U.S. its desired “special responsibilities” (in international security) 
with regard to the 1998 Rome Statue on the International Criminal Court, see David J. Scheffer, 
The US and the International Criminal Court, AM. J. INTL. L. 93 (1999) 12 at 18-19. The 
principle also explains how (in the post Kosovo period) 130 states of the G77 were able to adopt 
declarations (twice) explicitly labeling unilateral intervention as illegal under international law, 
see Ministerial Declaration, 23rd Annual Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
Group of 77, Sept. 24th 1999, (www.g77.org/Docs/Dec/Decl.1999.html), para 69; Declaration of 
the Group of 77, South Summit, Havana, Cuba, April 10-14th, 2000, (www.g77.org/Docs/Declara 
tion/G77Summit.htm), para 54.  
 
106 This is to say that it is not unprecedented for states to acquiesce to unilateral action or even 
endorse its incorporation into larger multilateral legal systems. For instance, “within a purely 
consensual system, there is nothing to stop 190 states…from according one state more or 
different rights than others”, see Byers, supra note 7 at 174 where he cites the UN Security 
Council (which allows the “veto” to the “permanent members”) and the World Bank, IMF (which 
incorporate “weighted voting, whereby rich states have more say than poorer states”) as 
contemporary examples of consensual inequality.  
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state relations are controlled by multilateralism) would be to stretch sovereignty far too 
thin.107 However, the mandate of multilateralism is most certainly established with regard 
to customary norms108 and those of peremptory importance or jus cogens,109 which 
clearly make multilateral action the ground rule,110and try to avoid their foisting upon a 
political or ideological minority, for in the long run, it would significantly devalue the 
concept.111 What is basic to any such peremptory norm is that once “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted”, it can be “modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”.112 Thus, in as much as peremptory norms 
of international law (for instance, the “use of force” and “non-intervention”) are 
concerned, the premise of sovereign equality forms the basis for mandatory and binding 
multilateralism.  
 Moreover, the value of sovereign equality against the backdrop of asymmetric 
warfare and unrecognized non-state actors is found in the need to ensure that Iraq does 
not recur; to safeguard the territorial integrity of nations. Without this assurance of formal 
 
107 However, the all too obvious paradigm shift towards multilateral governance is expressed 
accurately by Slaughter, supra note 104 at 285 when she concludes---“States can only govern 
effectively by actively cooperating with other states and by collectively reserving the power to 
intervene in other states’ affairs”. 
 
108 See Byers, supra note 7 at 175 where he argues that “Exceptional rights are even more rare in 
customary international law, where rules are derived from a combination of state practice and 
opinion juris (i.e. a belief in the existence of the relevant obligation) and widespread support or 
acquiescence is required for any legal change”. See generally, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7-10 (6th ed., OUP: 2003) (1966) [Hereinafter Brownlie].    
 
109 See Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna 23rd May, 1969, UN DOC 
A/CONF. 39/28; 8 ILM 679 (1980) 6,7 (which provides that a treaty will be void “if, at the time 
of its conclusion it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law”) [hereinafter 
VLT] 
 
110 See Shaw, supra note 15 at 97 where the author explains that a most stringent, “two stage 
process” is involved in the establishment of jus cogens, in the light of Art. 53 of the VLT: “first, 
the establishment of the proposition as a rule of general international law and secondly the 
acceptance of that rule as a peremptory norm by the international community”, because “the 
establishment of a higher level of binding rules has serious implications for the international law 
community”. 
 
111 For this reason, the appropriate test would require universal acceptance of the proposition as a 
legal rule by states and recognition of it as a rule of jus cogens by an overwhelming majority of 
states, crossing ideological and political divides, see IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, (2nd ed. Manchester, 1984) 218-224. This is also the reason that in 
U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros, (71 F. 3d. 754, 764 n.4 (9th Circuit 1995)) it was expressly noted that 
jus cogens norms are “…binding on all nations, and cannot be preempted by treaty” to prevent 
scattered interests from affecting its status as law.   
 
112 See VLT, supra note 109. 
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equality and also the promise of equal treatment before the law, international cooperation 
would become a myth. The need for sovereign equality, I would stress, is more than ever 
before; for in its absence international armed conflict and inter-state war would become 
inevitable.  
In furtherance of the same contention, Lee alludes to the “meaningful 
participation” by non-permanent members of the Security Council like Germany and 
Japan as being illustrative of an efficient system even in the absence of formal legal 
equality.113 This argument however neglects situations where the permanent members 
exercise their power-based veto’s to block the interests of other states or competing 
“oligarchies”. In the immediate post-WWII period, the veto was a recognized 
compromise on the part of states to ensure the cooperation of stronger state parties; its 
function being to place the burden to prevent conflict on those who held the power to 
cause large-scale international disturbance. To expect states to compromise yet again and 
this time to concede to an entirely different system of treatment before the rule of law 
would be to ask them to give away their sovereignty, not to an international organization 
but to another “supreme” state. This is a system, which subordinates one state to another 
and opens up a Pandora’s Box whereby the supreme state can legitimately proceed to 
pursue its interests even to the detriment of other states. The claim that the unipole would 
measure out its conduct so as not to tilt the balance (of allegiance owed by weaker states) 
in favour of competing “oligarchies”114is also suspect, firstly because the larger premise 
behind this new system is that the interest of the supreme state is weighed over those of 
others and the rule has been modified to suit its needs; and secondly because, a conflict of 
interests between this supreme and other states (oligarchies or otherwise) would 
immediately polarize the international community, creating blocks as the solution when 
there remains no remedy to be found in equal treatment before the law.    
 For all the conviction used to challenge the principle of sovereign equality, it 
needs to be realized that in as much as it may be a legal fiction, its presence is essential 
because the sense of security that comes with it permeates through and holds together the 
fabric of international relations.    
 
The argument against sovereign equality seeks to creation exceptions within the 
law (to make room for exceptionalism on the part of some states) by introducing riders 
like “except for the United States and its citizens” into every international legal obligation 
or organization to which the U.S. has objected.115 This course of reasoning, according to 
Lee would allow “the project of international law” to advance considerably, since the US 
would have no reason to “object to international law and no other state could use the 
United States’ defection from a generally binding rule as precedent for its own 
defection”.116While asymmetric conflict does indeed pose a credible threat to a nation 
 
113 See Lee, supra note 103 at 154. 
 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 150. 
 
116 Id.
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bound by a state-centric notion of multilateral international law, which does not 
recognize non-state actors and their motivations, the wisdom of allowing individual state 
(/s) to chalk out their own methods of preemption is questionable.  
It is questionable, because it would be an explicit move towards a power-oriented 
system of international relations as opposed to the rule-oriented system promoted for the 
better part of a century now.117 While almost all of international relations and diplomacy 
has been based on some permutation of the two,118 to “modify the rule just enough to fit 
the facts, to ensure that the act [of exceptionalist interventionism or preemptive use of 
force] will be lawful [for only a certain “supreme state”] in the future”,119would be to 
establish a rationale that expressly endorses a power based mechanism and denounces the 
pragmatic sanctity of rules in international law. Since other states would oppose the 
establishment of a Unipolar to whom the normal rules don’t apply, the next issue would 
be with regard to the superiority or inferiority of some states to others before the rule of 
law.  
The move towards the active acknowledgement of a “supreme” state, and thereby 
“lesser” states, would necessitate a reevaluation not only of international cooperation but 
also the legitimacy of custom as a universally binding principle of international law.       
What then would international custom evolve through? The conduct of the supreme or 
that of the other states. If the former, then how strictly would it be enforced against others 
and would defenses like the “persistent objector”120 hold up against the mandate of this 
supreme? And if the latter, then how far would it actually be able to bind and transcend 
the admittedly exceptional interests of the former?     
Owing to these and a myriad of other uncertainties, unilateral actions by “supreme 
state” aspirants have in the recent past met with the thorough disapproval of the 
international community creating a situation of distrust and diminished diplomatic 
influence on the part of such state(/s). Riding on its exceptionalist high, the West has 
made a few dangerous assumptions: It has used military/economic power and political 
influence to further its ‘national interests’ to the extent of alienating its peers121 and it 
 
117 See JOHN. H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations, 110 (2nd ed., 1997) (“To a large degree the history of civilization may be 
described as a gradual evolution from a power-oriented approach, in the state of nature, towards 
a rule-oriented approach…these governments have passed far along the scale toward a rule-
oriented approach…to ensure that rules are followed”). 
 
118 Id. 
119 See Lee, supra note 103 at 158. 
120 See Brownlie, supra note 108 at 10. 
 
121 This alienation is seen in the remarks of the European Union’s External Affairs Minister---
Chris Patten when in April 2002 he was quoted saying, “I see the U.S. unilateralist temptation as 
one of the central problems, perils, challenges and opportunities confronting the English-
speaking peoples of today”, see Roy Watson, “EU Calls on U.S. to Resist Unilateralist 
‘Temptation’”, Times (London, 1st may 2002). One instance is seen in the U.S.’s insistence on 
imposing the death penalty on international terrorists extradited from abroad,  which has created a 
rift with close allies like Europe (whose Supreme Court has prohibited the extradition of terrorists 
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may well be underestimating the intensity of actions that can follow from a sense of 
cultural exceptionalism (as opposed to one that arises to further economic and political 
convictions).122 Much like a dictator, a present day “supreme” state would need the 
legitimacy granted by its peers to be able to hold sway; this is severely damaged by a 
intentional disregard of their positions.  
 Indeterminacies like these lead us to consider other more viable options.  
 
(V) CONCLUSION: SAN FRANCISCO OR WESTPHALIA--Going back to where its safe 
 
The second scenario is one in which this miasma between law and violence is resisted 
and the UN’s approach to international relations is used to modify the behaviour of 
individual States and regional alliances to bring them in line with the restrictions that the 
Charter places on the classical Westphalian notion of international law.123 This conscious 
 
to the U.S. for trial without a commitment to waive capital punishment). Similarly, even the UK 
and Spain (U.S. allies in the war against terrorism) have maintained their reluctance to extradite 
terrorists (and even Osama Bin Laden in the event of his capture by British forces) unless the 
death penalty is waived, see Stern, supra note 75 at 290. Germany and France have similarly 
shown reluctance to hand over information against Zacarias Moussaoui regarding his 
involvement in the September 11th attacks, for fear that he would face the death penalty if 
convicted in the U.S., see Peter Finn, “Germany Reluctant to Aid Protection of Moussaoui”, 
Washington Post (11th June 2002). Since, international cooperation is crucial to the effectiveness 
of U.S. antiterrorism policies, transnational disagreements on issues like the treatment of 
detainees assume enormous importance. Routine aspects of transnational law enforcement have 
been complicated by the controversy. For instance, since the prisoners at Guantanamo are 
nationals of several co-belligerent states, the controversy has triggered diplomatic disputes 
between the United States and several important allies in the war against terrorism (including the 
United Kingdom and Australia), see KOH, supra note 28 at 1479 (2003). See also Manooher 
Mofidi & Amy Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War": The Law and Politics of 
Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 59 (2003). 
 
122 See JOHN ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM, 43 (2003) citing Sayyid 
Qutub’s statement that the enemy’s tools are political, economic and religio-cultural and they 
must be resisted at every level. See also Stern, Id. at 112-113, 275 where she argues that Islamic 
terrorists see liberalism and the western Capitalist construction of society as the cause of the 
conflict. However, even the U.S. has on occasion traced its freedoms to religion and declared that 
they are “not the grant of an government or document, but…our endowment from God”, see Dan 
Eggen, “Ashcroft Invokes Religion in U.S. War on Terror”, Washington Post (February 20th 
2002), A2.   
 
123 While the latter conception envisioned a highly decentralized world of sovereign states and 
was in favour of a permissive, voluntary system of law stressing matters of allocation of 
competence among sovereign states, the Charter paradigm modified some critical aspects---like 
the status of war, the role of national sovereignty and the degree to which authority structures are 
decentralized, see R. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International 
Legal Order in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 116 (Studies on a Just 
World Order, No. 2) (R. Falk, Freidrich Kratochwil, Saul H. Mendlovitz eds.) (London: 1985) 
[Hereinafter Falk] 
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and hard fought shift towards the Charter paradigm needs to be reiterated under present 
day circumstances.  
Writing about exceptionalism, like other subjects, entails some innate and 
unavoidable worries---like how does one distinguish between “exceptional” and 
“necessary”; legally correct and morally justified and so on. But possibly the most 
ringing question, in my mind was---“so what?”; indeed, how does a state react, how is the 
vicious cycle of action and retaliation on both sides (be it the US and Islamic extremism 
or others) get slowed down, if not stopped. Barring any crystal ball analysis, I would 
argue that to remain safe, foreign policy and international diplomacy must begin with an 
honest chance to the letter of the law---the Charter paradigm governing international 
relations;124because while the Westphalian notion rests upon the crucial role of consent in 
the forming of international obligations,125 the Charter system (even while giving respect 
to this traditional mode of law creation),126allows for the evolution of certain superior 
norms (such as customary law prohibiting the use of force) which are enforceable upon 
states despite their express codification in a treaty or agreement.  
The first principle which needs implementation in this scheme is the prohibition 
on war under Article 2(4) of the Charter. This restriction on the capacity of a state to 
resort to aggression was expressly adopted contrary to the Westphalian spirit which did 
not prohibit recourse to war.127 While there may not be an easy-to-use guide on how to 
prevent the pervasion of exceptional tendencies in international relations, unilateral 
recourse to aggression and war must be avoided to provide an atmosphere suitable for 
dialogue between nations or civilizations as the case may be. 
“Sovereign equality”, (discussed earlier with respect to Lee’s assertions) needs to 
be reinforced by strengthening the resolve against foreign intervention. The primary 
purpose of a foreign policy under the multilateral scheme must be the self-improvement 
of the state and the lives of its citizens through a mutually negotiated system of gains. 
This immediately requires that nation states not only be self-serving (i.e. focused on 
negotiating a mutually higher level of security and standard of living for their citizens) 
but also opposed to unsolicited benevolence abroad. This policy is hardly new to the UN 
 
124 This conception of the international legal order however, relies significantly on the ability of 
the international community to engage in collective action based upon a fair-minded 
interpretation of some common norms, the most central of which are enshrined in A/2(1) and 
A/2(7) of the Charter. See Id., where Falk asserts that the principles of “sovereign equality” and 
“non-intervention” are even common to the Westphalian notion of international law, Id. at 127.  
 
125 See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER 
PAPERS, 1-67 (1958); PERCY CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATION OF STATES, 17-89 
(1951). 
 
126 See Falk, supra note 123 at 127. See also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE 
ELIMINATION OF WAR (New York: 1961); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE 
OF FORCE BY STATES (London: 1963).  
 
127 In line with its emphasis on the subjective determination by states and its deference to state 
consent, the Westphalian conception vested the decision to wage war in the hands of the 
sovereign---the highest authority in international society, see Id. at 121.  
 
- 32 -
system which is meant to be used as a conduit to successful dialogue on common 
interests and to maintain a “hands off” policy with regard to the domestic interests of 
other States.128 
Exceptionalism displayed upon provocation is one issue but the rule of law faces 
a greater threat from the exceptionalism that is advanced on its own merit. Thus 
interventions into foreign States whether on humanitarian or democratic grounds must be 
by the UN129 and not based on the “concern” of individual non-involved States,130because 
while the former is a useful tool in international conflict resolution, the latter is 
guaranteed to incur the wrath of national and regional relativist groups like those who see 
themselves defending Islamic values.       
 
A parallel danger in pursuing unilateral, extraterritorial interventions is that at 
some stage every state engaged in a “war against terrorism” abroad, will be pressured to 
recast its efforts as part of a territorial defense mechanism131---as is the case with the U.S. 
and its Department of Homeland Security which threatens the freedoms of a liberal 
democratic society. The danger of playing such multifarious parts, was aptly enunciated 
by Hawthorne when he wrote,132 
“No man, for any considerable period, can wear one face to himself and 
another to the multitude, without finally getting bewildered as to which may 
be true.” 
 
128 See Art. 2(7), Charter, supra note 3.   
 
129 Id., arts. 41-43. 
 
130 See Max Boot, Neocons, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan/Feb 2004) 20 at 26 where the author 
differentiates between the foreign policy approaches of traditional conservatives and neo-
conservatives. In doing so, he quotes columnist George Will to stress that while traditional 
conservatives try to, “Preserve U.S. sovereignty and freedom of action by marginalizing the 
United Nations. Reserve military interventions for reasons of U.S. national security, not altruism. 
Beware…’nation-building’”, “Neocons, by contrast, are committed above all to U.S. global 
leadership…”. Boot further reiterates, “Neocons believe the United States should use force when 
necessary to champion its ideals as well as its interests, not only out of sheer humanitarianism 
but also because the spread of liberal democracy improves national security…”, at 24. This 
neoconservative approach to international relations is possibly far more dangerous since it 
promotes intervention to safeguard against “security threats” as well as on ideological grounds 
i.e. to promote national ideals abroad. 
 
131 See DIEGO GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA, 2 (1995), where the author compares the 
“protection” based justifications given by the Sicilian mafia to the exaggerated perception of 
threats (to national security) that governments use to sell increased domestic security to their 
citizens. 
 
132 See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, SCARLET LETTER (Bantam Publishers, Reissue Edition--April 
1, 1965) 
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Now is not the time to go “abroad in search of monsters to destroy”,133 because in 
playing hunters and slayers, states are losing their identities as self-serving units striving 
for self-improvement. Moreover, such an intrusion especially at this present critical 
juncture would cause a definite breach of the social compact. It is time for the 
international system as a whole to take a step back and concern itself with addressing 
admitted common problems through an increasing number of “temporary 
alliances”134which collectively address the specific issues in question. This is not to say 
that States need to be isolationist; rather they must base foreign policy on pragmaticism 
and not on the pursuit of contentious ideologies (to which allegiance must be sought at 
home and abroad). 
 
But what then of exceptionalism?  
 
What then of Noll’s insistence that,  
 
“Invoking law – whether in terms of Human Rights or the UN Charter -- 
against this [sovereign] nomos [which believes in the necessity of a state of 
exception] would be ridiculous, and will at worst fortify the indistinction 
between violence and justice. Where the social contract is derogated 
permanently, violence is no longer a mere ‘possibility’ and it becomes 
meaningless to speak of a ‘forcible excess’.”135 
The answer may well lie in the fact that Noll’s premise of a present and enduring 
breach in the social contract (“where the contract is derogated permanently”)136 isn’t 
entirely established; it is still too early to state with any degree of confidence that the 
U.N. collective security mechanism has been subverted. Evidence of this is found in the 
fact that although enough and more concerns have been aired, exceptionalism by itself is 
not being accepted or internalized by the international community;137 quite to the 
contrary, exceptionalist actions on the part of states are openly rebuked and isolated.  
 
133 See Thomas G. West, Leo Strauss and American Foreign Policy, quoting John Quincy Adams, 
speech delivered on July 4, 1821, (available at: http://www.claremont.org/writings/crb /summer2 
004/west.h tml) [hereinafter West] 
 
134 Id. Quoting Thomas Jefferson, Farewell Address where while acknowledging the contribution 
of France to America’s independence, he argued for a future of “temporary alliances” so that 
America would retain freedom of action to "choose peace or war, as our interest guided by 
justice shall counsel." America's interest (national security) was to be limited by justice 
(refraining from violating the rights of other nations).  
 
135 See Noll, supra note 88 at 219. 
 
136 Id. 
 
137 The constant questioning, criticism and rebuke faced by the NATO, the Bush, Blair 
governments over Kosovo and Iraq are reminders of the international communities disaffection 
with exceptional unilateral acts becoming the norm, see Raphael Minder, “Barroso Criticizes 
'Arrogant' America”, Financial Times (UK) (available at: http://www.commondreams.org/headli 
nes04/0713-07.htm); “German Leaders Criticize US Stance on Iraq as 'Mistake'”, (available at:  
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The answer may well lie in pursuing a policy of limited interaction with foreign 
states whereby States would recognize, appreciate and negotiate the terms and extent of 
cultural relativism, a reconsideration of immediate and forced imposition of democracy in 
every society and the State’s need to feel secure about its sovereignty. Safety is also to be 
found in not forcing the hand of foreign religious and cultural institutions but rather by 
providing incentives and in trusting host nations to use them for the promotion of pubic 
welfare as may be deemed fit in every individual State. Thus, in the future, 
multilateralism must lay significant stress on and provide adequate rope to individual 
States to pursue independent foreign policy aimed at the self-centered pursuit of 
improvement of their own societies without encroaching upon the sovereignty and 
freedoms of other States and non-state actors respectively. While national security 
measures to safeguard against threats from foreign militia is important, the value and 
consequences of preemption must be carefully weighed alongside the intelligence 
gathered as well as the counsel provided by the United Nations. 
What needs to be clearly understood is that the pursuit of an exceptional approach 
to international law and diplomacy will open doors to retaliation while closing doors to 
co-operative mechanisms. As such it serves neither the multilateral order nor any private 
aspirations of empire.         
 
It is often argued that the problems caused by exceptional tendencies are not 
going to be resolved by the application of the international legal principles because they 
arise out of causes which range from emotion, socio-economic pride to religious fervor, 
none of which fall within the realm of conduct, rights and obligations that the law would 
seek to control.138 While it is true that not all forms of exceptionalism can be controlled 
by the direct application of normative international legal principles, walking the legal line 
with honesty will weed out double standards (which incite extremism), manipulation 
(which breeds distrust) and suspicion thereby removing opportunities for a rise of 
exceptional tendencies against the safety of the cooperative multilateral process.  
On a personal note, I believe that in allowing exceptionalist activities to create an 
order which endorses the sidestepping of international legal standards (for reasons 
ranging from fear to retribution), we effectively turn a blind eye to our misgivings; and 
the rule of law was never meant for the coward.  
 
http://english.people.com.cn/200208/28/eng20020828102214.shtml); “Schroeder Continues to 
Criticizes US on Iraqi Issue”, (available at: http://english.people.com.c n/200209/05/eng2002 
0905_102676.shtml). The same message may lie behind the overturning of Prime Minister Jose 
Maria Aznar’s government in Spain, see Ivo H. Daalder, “The Warning in Spain's Election”, 
NRC Handelsblad, March 17, 2004 (available at: http://www.brookings.ed u/views/op- 
ed/daalder/20040317.htm). 
 
138 See Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. L. PROC.
265, 268 (2002) where he asserts that, “It is naïve to expect that a stable international order can 
be erected on normative principles embodied in international law”.   
